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Abstract 
We look at the effects of restructuring on three issues: (a) economic surplus and environmental quality, 
(b) the cost of NOx control policies and who bears the costs, and (c) the cost-effectiveness of a seasonal 
and an annual NOx cap in the SIP Call region. We find that without the NOx cap, nationwide restructuring 
leads to higher NOx and carbon emissions from the electricity sector. Adding either a seasonal or an 
annual NOx cap-and-trade regime in the eastern United States mitigates the increase in NOx emissions but 
has a much smaller effect on carbon emissions. The out-of-pocket compliance cost associated with 
achieving a seasonal or an annual NOx cap is moderately higher with nationwide restructuring than 
without, but the changes in economic surplus are significantly higher. However, the economic benefits of 
nationwide restructuring more than offset the higher costs of controlling NOx emissions in a more 
competitive environment. The foregone economic surplus is compared with the benefits resulting from 
NOx emission reductions using an integrated assessment model of atmospheric transport and valuation of 
human health effects. We find an annual policy dominates a seasonal policy from a cost effectiveness 
perspective under limited restructuring, and even more strongly under nationwide restructuring. 
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1. Introduction 
The electric power sector is in the midst of two major regulatory changes. One is a 
change in the scope of economic regulation facing the industry. Historically, all of the functions 
of the industry—generation, transmission, distribution, and retail sales—typically have been 
integrated in a single firm that was subject to price regulation, generally based on costs. In recent 
years, however, generation and retail sales have increasingly been opened up to competition in 
several states. This process of opening the markets to competition, generally referred to as 
“electricity restructuring,” is ongoing at the state level, and numerous legislative proposals that 
have been introduced in the U.S. Congress would expand these efforts nationwide. 
The second important change facing the industry is the apparently increasing scope and 
stringency of environmental regulation. Historically, the most stringent environmental standards 
facing electricity generators have been those imposed on new sources, known as new source 
performance standards (NSPSs). Beginning with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
existing generators also have faced increasingly stringent regulation of their sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. Restrictions on summer emissions of NOx from electricity 
generators in a majority of eastern states are expected to become even tighter during the next 
decade with the implementation of the call for amendments to state implementation plans (SIPs) 
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), known as the NOx SIP Call. This new 
regulation is designed to address the long-range transport of NOx as a contributing factor to 
summer air pollution in cities on the East Coast. Recent lawsuits filed by EPA and New York 
State also have raised the possibility that many existing generating sources were negligent in not 
bringing their facilities into compliance with NSPSs when they made substantial investments 
enabling greater electricity generation at these facilities. The EPA also is committed to 
promulgating a final rule to control mercury from fossil-fired electric power plants by 2004. 
                                                 
∗   Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
2 
Moreover, concern about global warming and the search for ways to comply with the greenhouse 
gas reductions called for in the Kyoto Protocol have led to many proposals for capping or 
reducing carbon emissions from the electricity sector. 
In this paper, we analyze how greater competition in the electricity sector is likely to 
affect environmental quality and the costs of reducing NOx emissions. The analysis has three 
dimensions. First, under a given set of NOx regulations, we ask how allowing greater competition 
in electricity markets will affect the location and quantity of NOx emissions and total carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions from the electricity sector. In the case of NOx, we further analyze the 
effects of these changes in emissions on health status and associated economic damages. Second, 
we seek to determine how allowing competition affects the costs of different NOx policies as 
well as who (electricity producers and which customer class of consumers) bears these costs. 
Third, we look at the cost effectiveness of different approaches to regulating NOx emissions. We 
use an integrated assessment model of atmospheric transport and valuation of human health 
effects to estimate net benefits of the different approaches. 
We find that restructuring leads to economic surplus gains for both producers and 
consumers, and industrial consumers claim the largest share of the additional consumer surplus 
gains from restructuring. However, without the NOx SIP Call, nationwide restructuring leads to 
higher NOx and carbon emissions from the electricity sector. Adding either a seasonal or an 
annual NOx cap-and-trade regime in the eastern United States mitigates the increase in NOx 
emissions, but has a negligible effect on carbon emissions, which remain above the level under 
limited restructuring. The health benefits associated with a seasonal or an annual NOx policy are 
greater under nationwide restructuring than under limited restructuring, compared to the each 
restructuring scenario in the absence of a NOx policy in the SIP region.  
On the cost side, the out-of-pocket compliance costs associated with achieving either a 
seasonal or an annual NOx cap are higher with nationwide restructuring than without. Society’s 
economic surplus losses associated with the NOx caps are less than compliance costs under 
limited restructuring. This difference is due in large part to the inefficient pricing of electricity, 
which causes reductions in electricity consumption to be valued less than marginal generation 
cost under limited restructuring. Under nationwide restructuring electricity is priced efficiently 
and the economic surplus losses resulting from the NOx caps are significantly larger.  Under 
limited restructuring the consumers are better off (i.e., consumer surplus increases) and 
producers are worse off because of the NOx policies. However, this sharing of burden of the NOx 
policies between consumers and producers is mostly reversed under nationwide structuring. The Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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incremental change in consumer surplus is negative when the NOx policies are added under 
nationwide restructuring, while producers are almost unaffected.  
We evaluate the cost-effectiveness of seasonal versus annual programs by comparing 
changes in economic surplus in the electricity sector with health benefits. Under limited 
restructuring, we find significant additional net benefits (benefits minus costs) would be 
achieved by substituting an annual program for a seasonal program. Under nationwide 
restructuring an annual program would yield almost $620 million in additional net benefits, 
compared to a seasonal program. The benefit-cost ratio is less than one in each case (net benefits 
are negative) but the inclusion of non-health and non-particulate related benefits would be likely 
to make the benefit-cost ratio greater than one, especially under an annual policy. However, we 
examine only particulate-related health benefits and the inclusion of non-health particulate-
related benefits would boost the relative performance of an annual program.   
2. Motivation 
The U.S. electric power industry has been in the process of restructuring for nearly 10 
years. Electricity restructuring was set into motion with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 
1992. The act called on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to order all 
transmission-owning utilities to allow open access to their transmission systems at 
nondiscriminatory, cost-based transmission rates to facilitate competitive wholesale power 
transactions.1 Most of the deregulatory activity directed at retail markets has been at the state 
level. Between 1992 and the end of 2000, about half of the states in the country passed 
legislation or made regulatory decisions to allow retail competition.2 During the 105th and 106th 
Congress, several bills were introduced to implement retail competition nationwide, but none 
made it to the floor of the House of Representatives or the Senate. 
                                                 
1 FERC implemented this requirement by issuing Order 888 in 1996. Over time, FERC recognized that Order 888 
was only a limited success, in part because utilities that owned both generation and transmission facilities had little 
incentive to really open up their transmission grids for use by their competitors in generation markets. In 1999, 
FERC issued Order 2000 in an effort to break the link between generation and transmission activities. Order 2000 
provides specific guidelines and incentives for the establishment of independent regional transmission organizations 
to manage use of the transmission grid. 
2 Ando and Palmer (1998), White (1996), and Hunt and Sepetys (1997) analyze the factors that influence state 
decisions about the direction and pace of restructuring. The status of state deregulatory activities is tracked by the 
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One important unanswered question throughout the debate about electricity restructuring 
at both wholesale and retail market levels is how the move from regulation to competition will 
affect the environment.3 During the debate over FERC orders to open access to transmission 
systems, environmentalists and others raised concerns that allowing more open access to 
transmission would lead to the increased use of older, higher-polluting coal-fired facilities in the 
Midwest and related increases in emissions. As different states debated whether to allow retail 
competition, environmentalists became concerned about the potential demise of utility programs 
that promoted demand-side management and the use of renewable energy sources as well as the 
associated consequences for utility emissions and the environment. In addition, if restructuring 
delivered the promised lower prices for electricity, then increased levels of electricity demand 
could also yield higher emissions. 
A limited body of earlier research offers a range of perspectives on these questions, but 
the compendium of evidence is far from conclusive, partly because of the many assumptions that 
underlie the various scenarios. Several of these studies, including those by Lee and Darani 
(1996), the Center for Clean Air Policy (1996a, 1996b, 1996c), and Rosen and others (1995), 
find potentially large effects of increased interregional power trading on utility emissions of NOx 
and CO2. In two analyses of the proposed environmental impacts of its two transmission orders, 
FERC (1996b, 1999) finds a much more limited effect of increased power trading on air 
emissions. EIA (1996) also finds that open transmission access increases NOx emissions by 
between 1% and 3% above the baseline scenario, with the largest effects happening in the early 
years.  
Palmer and Burtraw (1997) look at the potential impacts of electricity restructuring on 
NOx and CO2 emissions and on subsequent changes in atmospheric NOx and nitrate 
concentrations at the regional level and also consider the ultimate effect on human health. Their 
results concerning emissions effects fall roughly in the middle of the estimates from the prior 
literature. Burtraw, Palmer, and Paul (1999) find substantially smaller impacts of electricity 
restructuring on NOx and CO2 emissions in the near term, with NOx emissions increases of 4% or 
less relative to the baseline and annual carbon emission increases of just under 2% in the absence 
of any policy to promote renewable energy sources. U.S. DOE (1999) looks at the emissions 
effects of the Clinton administration’s Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act of 1999 and 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the many different ways by which electricity restructuring could have an effect on the 
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demonstrates that the act, with its provisions to promote greater use of renewables and 
distributed generation, will lead to a reduction in NOx and carbon emissions compared with an 
average cost baseline.  
Most of the prior analyses of the effect of restructuring on emissions ignored the effect of 
EPA’s 1998 NOx SIP Call on summer NOx emissions from electricity generators in the eastern 
United States.4 EPA’s NOx SIP Call is designed to address problems of long-range transport of 
ozone in this region. It includes a regional cap-and-trade program for summertime NOx 
emissions in the SIP Call region, which, as recently reconstituted by the courts, includes 19 states 
and the District of Columbia.5 The five-month summer emissions cap under this program is 
based on an average NOx emission rate of about 0.15 pound per million Btu’s of heat input at 
fossil fuel–fired boilers. The program would lead to annual reductions in NOx emissions of 22% 
by 2007 and summertime reductions of 40% in the same year (U.S. EPA 1998a.). In the SIP Call 
region, the program would reduce NOx emissions by 40% annually in 2007 and by 62% in the 
summers (U.S. EPA 1998b, Table 2-1).6 By imposing summertime caps on NOx emissions that 
apply to both new and existing generating facilities, this program eliminates the possibility of 
increasing aggregate summertime NOx emissions in the SIP Call region as a result of 
restructuring.  
Nonetheless, NOx emissions during other seasons and in other regions could rise as a 
result of increased power trading or increased generation to meet higher levels of demand 
brought about by anticipated lower prices under competition. These additional NOx emissions 
could contribute to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone. Moreover, additional NOx 
emissions could contribute to higher concentrations of particulate matter, which has been firmly 
associated with human health morbidity and mortality effects; particulate matter also is 
considered by many economists and health scientists to pose a more serious threat to human 
health than ozone concentrations. In addition, NOx emissions cause the deposition of nitrates, 
which contribute to environmental problems such as the acidification of some ecosystems. 
                                                 
4 Palmer and others (1998) and Burtraw, Palmer, and Paul (1999) include an annual cap on NOx emissions in the SIP 
region. U.S. DOE (1999) includes the five-month summer cap applied to the original 22-state NOx SIP Call region. 
5 For more information about the recent history of the regulation of NOx emissions from the electric power sector, 
see  Burtraw and others (2000). 
6 The percent reductions pertain to EPA’s original program that targeted 22 states and the District of Columbia. The 
EPA baseline includes only Phase I controls in the OTR.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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If NOx emissions from electricity generators were subject to an annual cap, then 
restructuring would have no effect on aggregate NOx emissions.7 Environmentalists have 
proposed expanding the NOx SIP Call to an annual program (Environmental Defense 2000). 
Burtraw and others (2000) analyze the cost-effectiveness of different NOx policies, including a 
SIP seasonal and a SIP annual policy. They find that an annual NOx emissions cap in the SIP 
Call region yields nearly $400 million more in annual net benefits in 2008 than those realized 
with a seasonal policy. In their analysis, they assume that no states move to implement electricity 
restructuring beyond those that had made a decision as of 2000. Thus, they do not consider how 
additional changes in economic regulation facing the industry might affect the cost-effectiveness 
of different NOx control polices. Also, they measure net benefits as the difference between 
particulate related health benefits and compliance costs. They do not consider economic surplus 
in the electricity market. 
In this paper, we consider the effects of restructuring on (a) economic surplus and 
environmental quality, (b) the cost of NOx control policies and who bears the costs, and (c) the 
cost-effectiveness of a seasonal and an annual NOx cap in the SIP Call region. We anticipate that 
restructuring might affect the cost and cost-effectiveness of a NOx emissions cap-and-trade 
program in several ways.  
First, more widespread adoption of marginal cost pricing is expected to lead to 
accelerated productivity gains in the electricity generation sector nationwide. In our model, these 
productivity enhancements take several forms including lower heat rates, higher generating unit 
availability and lower costs of production at existing generators.  The cost savings associated 
with these improvements may offset some of the costs of greater NOx controls, or introduce 
additional flexibility in compliance due to greater flexibility in the operation of generators. 
Alternatively, efficiency improvements at existing coal plants that have relatively high emission 
rates could raise the opportunity costs of substituting away from using these plants toward lower 
polluting plants. This change could be perceived to raise the costs of reducing NOx emissions.  
Second, the consumption of electricity during peak periods is consistently above its 
economically efficient level because electricity is priced below its marginal cost. This is true for 
all customers in those regions where restructuring has not taken place and electricity is priced at 
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average cost, and to a lesser degree in competitive regions for residential and commercial 
customers who face a uniform electricity price that does not vary by time-of-day (although it is 
tied to marginal rather than average costs). In other words, the opportunity cost to consumers, or 
equivalently the marginal consumer surplus, is less than marginal cost of production. 8 
Consequently, the imposition of an environmental policy that raises cost may have a smaller 
effect on consumer surplus than is the measure of the compliance cost of the policy.9 The 
converse is true in baseload periods, when electricity price is consistently greater than marginal 
cost. However, where the inefficient pricing problem is eliminated with time-of-day marginal-
cost pricing of electricity, the economic costs of the NOx control policy is guaranteed to be 
greater in magnitude than the compliance costs due to the loss in consumer surplus associated 
with reduced consumption. 
Third, nationwide adoption of retail competition could generate greater inter-regional 
trading of electricity, particularly if widespread restructuring leads to expansion of inter-regional 
transmission capability as assumed in the scenarios modeled here.  With greater transmission 
capacity, electricity generation could migrate out of the SIP Call region helping to reduce NOx 
emissions in the region and potentially lower the costs of achieving the NOx emission caps, but 
increasing emissions in the West. 
Finally, restructuring may have an effect on the distribution of NOx control costs born by 
producers and by consumers. Tradable NOx emission allowances have an opportunity cost equal 
to the marginal cost of NOx emission reductions. We assume allowances are allocated to firms at 
zero cost – so-called “grandfathering” - as currently intended by most states planning to 
participate in the NOx trading program and as characterized the SO2 trading program 
implemented under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. In average cost regions, emission 
allowances are reflected in the calculation of total costs according to their original cost when 
acquired by the firm. Because the original allocation was at zero cost, only the costs of 
allowances acquired in excess of the original allocation are considered to be part of the total 
                                                 
8 Brennan (1998) discusses this inefficiency in taxing electricity to fund utility DSM programs.  He also points out 
that the inefficiencies associated with pricing electricity transmission and distribution, the two industry segments 
with declining average costs, at average cost without congestion pricing work in the other direction.  However, since 
the cost of generation constitutes more than 60% of the total cost of electricity, we conjecture that the inefficiency 
with respect to generation pricing outweighs the inefficiency with respect to pricing of T&D. 
9 In a similar context, Oates and Strassman (1984) demonstrate that monopoly pricing of a polluting good limits 
consumption, and thereby reduces the size of the environmental externality associated with its production. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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costs to be recovered in the price of electricity. However, in marginal-cost regions, the 
opportunity cost of NOx emissions allowances is reflected in the electricity price in a manner 
analogous to other variable costs of generation, such as fuel costs. In this case, NOx emissions 
allowances are reflected in marginal costs to the extent that the marginal generating unit at any 
particular instant requires NOx emissions allowances to generate. When the marginal generating 
unit is coal-fired, the cost of NOx emissions allowances is fully reflected in the price of 
electricity paid by consumers. When the marginal generating unit is gas-fired, the cost of NOx 
emissions allowances will play a smaller role in the price of electricity because gas-fired units 
typically have lower emissions per unit of generation, and producers will bear more of the cost of 
the NOx policy. 
3. Scenarios 
The scenarios constructed for this analysis reflect a combination of assumptions about 
how many regions have implemented marginal-cost pricing of electricity and about the 
environmental regulatory regime governing NOx emissions from the electricity sector. In the next 
two sections, we describe the economic regulatory scenarios and the NOx policy scenarios in 
turn. In each of the scenarios, we assume that no policies are implemented to reduce CO2 
emissions and that no changes are made in the regulation of SO2 emissions beyond those 
established under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
3.1  Economic Regulatory Scenarios  
Analyzing the effects of nationwide restructuring on environmental quality and emissions 
control costs requires a baseline scenario with which the more comprehensive restructuring 
scenario can be compared. Because several regions have already restructured their electricity 
markets, it would be unrealistic for this baseline to assume average-cost pricing of electricity, as 
applied under cost-of-service regulation, in all regions. Instead, we construct a limited 
restructuring scenario by assuming that marginal-cost pricing of electricity is implemented in 
those regions and subregions of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), where 
most of the population resides in states that have already made a commitment to implement 
restructuring. The schedule for transition from cost-of-service to marginal-cost or market-based 
pricing under the baseline scenario is reported in Table 1 by region. In the limited restructuring 
scenario, no other regions adopt marginal-cost pricing over the course of the forecast period, 
which extends to 2012. All other regions are assumed to price electricity at average cost. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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The alternative economic regulatory scenario labeled nationwide restructuring assumes 
that restructuring is implemented across the country by 2008. As shown in the column of Table 1 
labeled nationwide restructuring, three regions are assumed to implement restructuring in 2004 
and the remaining five regions do so by 2008.  Several features distinguish how prices are set in 
restructured regions. First, we assume that in all marginal cost regions, utilities recover 90% of 
their costs of assets that are “stranded” in the transition from cost of service to competitive 
pricing.  Second, we assume that the use of time-varying prices of electricity will become more 
widespread as a result of restructuring. We represent this assumption by requiring industrial 
customers to face time-of-day pricing in any region that has implemented marginal cost pricing. 
In all other regions and for all other customer classes in all regions, the retail price is assumed 
not to vary between peak and off-peak times, but can vary across seasons.  
The third way that prices differ between marginal and average cost regions is the pricing 
of ancillary reserve services. In all regions, scheduled outages and flexible (non run-of-river) 
hydro generation are allocated to minimize cost by season and time block (for hydro), then 
generation within a time block is dispatched according to variable cost. After energy demand is 
satisfied, remaining generation capability is ordered according to fixed cost (per MW) to 
construct a supply curve for reserve services. Reserve services are differentiated to the extent 
that steam generators are limited to provide only fifty percent of total reserves and the total 
reserve requirement in each region is based on total demand. The determination of price for 
reserve services differs between marginal and average cost regions. In marginal cost regions, an 
equilibrium marginal price for reserve services is determined through a simultaneous 
convergence in all regions and time blocks. We impose an incentive compatibility constraint 
requiring that, in addition to those units providing reserve services, generating units also receive 
the marginal reserve price. This constraint guarantees that units have no incentive to switch 
between generation and reserve services as long as each behaves atomistically (strategic market 
power has no role). In contrast, in average cost regions we take the fixed cost (per MW) of the 
marginal reserve unit and apportion it across all time blocks in which that unit provides 
generation or reserve services, and recover only a portion in the time block in which the unit is 
marginal. These two approaches yield quite comparable marginal reserve “prices” reflecting the 
marginal scarcity value of reserve services for a given level of generation capacity and electricity 
demand.  
In addition to the method of pricing electricity there are several parameters in the model 
that take on different values in the nationwide restructuring scenario than in the limited 
restructuring scenario (Table 2). They fall into three categories: productivity change, Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
10 
transmission capability and renewables policy. Productivity change is implemented in the model 
through changes in four parameters: improvements in the maximum capacity factor at existing 
generators, reductions in the heat rate at existing coal-fired generators, reductions in operating 
costs and reductions in general and administrative costs at all existing generators. The rate of 
change in these four parameters is a function of the proportion of the country that has committed 
to marginal cost pricing. A single value applies to the entire country, reflecting the common 
availability of technology and the common investment climate shared by firms in different 
regions, as well as the expectation that marginal cost pricing and competition could spread to all 
regions in the future. As the number of regions committing to marginal cost pricing grows, the 
rate of improvement in these four parameters grows.10  Table 2 is a summary of the ratios of the 
values in 2008 to the values in 1997 (the year of our data) for each of these variables under the 
two economic restructuring scenarios. 
Two of the key uncertainties surrounding the future of the U.S. electricity system are how 
much the utilities that own transmission lines will choose to invest in expanding transmission 
capability and when these investments will take place. Regulators have been struggling to price 
electricity transmission in a way that provides economic signals of the costs created by 
congesting the transmission grid and, at the same time, provides incentives for transmission 
owning utilities to make investments that would reduce that congestion.  With more open 
markets there will be greater pressure to trade electricity and, presumably that pressure will be 
translated into expanded transmission capability.  We anticipate this outcome by making 
different assumptions regarding transmission capability in the two economic scenarios.  In the 
limited restructuring scenario, we assume that inter-regional transmission capability does not 
grow over time.  In the nationwide restructuring scenario, we assume that by 2008 transmission 
capability is 10% higher than it was in the limited restructuring scenario. 
Many restructuring proposals also include provisions to promote the use of 
nonhydroelectric renewables-based technologies for electricity generation. The most popular 
provision of this type is the renewables portfolio standard (RPS). An RPS is a requirement that a 
certain percentage of the electricity sold to customers must be generated using a renewables-
                                                 
10 Specifically, the rate of change in the three productivity change parameters is a weighted sum. The sum is the 
proportion of megawatt hours sold in marginal cost pricing regions times an optimistic rate of change, plus the 
proportion of megawatt hours sold in average cost pricing regions times the historical rate of change (under average 
cost pricing) in each parameter. The weights are constructed using electricity sales data from 2000, prior to the 
implementation of restructuring in most states. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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based technology. RPS proposals are part of the restructuring legislation in several states, 
including Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts. RPS requirements ranging from 3% to 7.5% 
have been included in different legislative proposals for federal restructuring. Most RPS 
proposals exclude hydroelectric facilities.11 We assume that an RPS is implemented in 2008 in 
the nationwide restructuring case, which mirrors recent proposals by setting a goal for 
penetration of renewables while setting a cap on the subsidy that can be earned by renewables. 
The cap is set at $17 per megawatt-hour, slightly inflated from the $15 cap included in the 
Clinton administration proposal. In every example we describe, the subsidy cap is binding, 
yielding renewables-based electricity generation of less than 3.5% of total generation. The 
nonhydroelectric renewables-based technologies that qualify for the RPS in our model are wind, 
solar, dedicated biomass, municipal solid waste, and geothermal.12 
3.2  NOx Policy Scenarios 
Each of the two economic regulatory policy scenarios described above is investigated in 
conjunction with each of three different sets of assumptions about NOx policy.  The baseline NOx 
policy scenario includes the NOx trading program (known as “Phase II”) in the northeastern 
Ozone Transport Region (OTR) but excludes new policies to reduce NOx in the multi-state SIP 
Call region. The regions included in the OTR NOx trading program are identified in Table 1.  
The first alternative NOx policy scenario is labeled SIP Seasonal, and it corresponds to 
EPA’s proposed program described previously as the NOx SIP call. This scenario includes a five-
month summer ozone program implemented in the eastern United States represented by the 
regions in our model that are approximately equal to the SIP Call region.13  The included regions 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of different RPS proposals, see Clemmer, Nogee, and Brower 1998. 
12 We assume that any electricity generated by co-firing a coal-fired generator with a minimal percentage of 
biomass fuel would not be allowed to be counted against an RPS. 
13 These regions include NE (New England); MAAC (Maryland, District of Columbia, Delaware, and New Jersey; 
most of Pennsylvania); New York; STV (Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina; parts 
of Virginia, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Florida); ECAR (Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and West Virginia; parts of 
Kentucky, Virginia, and Pennsylvania); and MAIN (most of Illinois and Wisconsin; part of Missouri). They exclude 
a small portion of western Missouri that is part of the 19 states and small parts of Illinois and Wisconsin. These 
regions include the eastern half of Mississippi, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, which are not part of the 
region identified by EPA. However, the other New England states—Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island—are part of the eastern region covered by the OTR. The reconciliation of these two programs may ultimately 
involve their participation. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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are identified in the last column of Table 1. The emissions cap under this policy is 444,300 tons 
per five-month summer season within the SIP Call region, compared with an emissions level of 
1.465 million tons in the baseline NOx scenario in year 2008 under limited restructuring.14  
The second alternative NOx policy scenario is SIP Annual. Here, the average emissions 
rate achieved during the five-month summer season for the SIP Call region is extended to an 
annual basis. The annual emissions cap under this policy is 1.06 million tons per year within the 
SIP region, compared with an emissions level of 3.502 million tons in the baseline NOx scenario 
in year 2008 under limited restructuring.    
In both of the alternative NOx policy scenarios we assume the policy is announced in 
2001 and implemented in 2004. We report results for 2008, hoping thereby to avoid transitional 
difficulties in implementing the policy that may characterize the first years of the program 
(NERC 2000). 
4. The Models  
The Haiku electricity market model calculates equilibria in regional electricity markets 
with interregional electricity trade.15 The model includes fully integrated algorithms for 
investment and retirement of generation capacity, selection of NOx emissions control technology, 
and SO2 compliance. It simulates demand, prices, supply composition, and the emissions of 
major pollutants (NOx, SO2, mercury, and CO2). Generator dispatch is based on minimizing the 
short-run variable costs of generation. 
Two important components of the Haiku model are the Intraregional Electricity Market 
Component and the Interregional Power Trading Component. The Intraregional Electricity 
Market Component solves for a market equilibrium identified by the intersection of price-
sensitive electricity demand for three customer classes (residential, industrial, and commercial) 
and supply curves for four time periods (peak, shoulder, middle, and base load hours) in three 
                                                 
14 This emission cap was determined by applying the emissions rate of 0.15 lb per MMBtu to fossil-fired generation 
in the baseline for 1997, which is the same methodology applied by EPA. Forecast electricity generation varies 
slightly in our model, and the geographic coverage varies slightly, from the EPA model (U.S. EPA 1998a, 1998b, 
1999).  
15 The Haiku model was developed to contribute to integrated assessment with support from EPA, the U.S. 
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seasons (summer, winter, and spring-fall) within the 13 NERC regions and subregions.16 Each 
regional supply curve is parameterized using cost estimates and capacity information for up to 45 
aggregate “model plants” defined by technology, fuel, and vintage. The Interregional Power 
Trading Component solves for the level of interregional power trading necessary to achieve 
equilibrium in regional electricity prices (gross of transmission costs and power losses). These 
interregional transactions are constrained by the assumed level of available interregional 
transmission capability.  
The model can be used to simulate changes in electricity markets that stem from public 
policy associated with increased competition or environmental regulation. In this analysis, we 
consider changes in both types of policies. We look at how electric market restructuring is likely 
to affect NOx and CO2 emissions and the costs of controlling NOx policy. 
Changes in emissions of relevant pollutants are fed into the Tracking and Analysis 
Framework (TAF). TAF is a nonproprietary and peer-reviewed model constructed with the 
Analytica modeling software (Bloyd and others 1996).17 TAF integrates pollutant transport and 
deposition (including formation of secondary particulates but excluding ozone), visibility effects, 
effects on recreational lake fishing through changes in soil and aquatic chemistry, human health 
effects, and valuation of benefits.  
In this exercise, only human health effects are evaluated. These values are calculated at 
the state level and aggregated to the NERC subregion level; changes outside the United States 
are not evaluated. Health effects are characterized as changes in health status predicted to result 
from changes in air pollution concentrations. Impacts are expressed as the number of days of 
acute morbidity effects of various types, the number of chronic disease cases, and the number of 
statistical lives lost to premature death. The health module is based on concentration–response 
functions found in the peer-reviewed literature,18 primarily from articles reviewed in EPA’s 
                                                 
16 The electricity demand functions include customer class specific elasticities of demand that vary by season.  
Electricity consumers pay a price based on the average marginal cost across different load blocks, but customers do 
not see prices that vary by time-of-day. 
17 Each TAF module was constructed and refined by experts in that field, and the integrated model draws primarily 
on peer-reviewed literature. TAF is the work of a team of over 30 modelers and scientists from institutions around 
the country. As the framework integrating these literatures, TAF itself was subject to an extensive peer review in 
December 1995, which concluded that “TAF represent(s) a major advancement in our ability to perform integrated 
assessments” and that the model was ready for use by NAPAP (ORNL 1995). The entire model is available at 
www.lumina.com\taflist. 
18 See Bloyd and others 1996 and http://www.lumina.com/taflist. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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criteria documents (for example, EPA Section 812 prospective and retrospective studies). It 
contains concentration–response functions for particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in 
diameter (PM10), total suspended particulates, SO2, sulfates, nitrogen dioxide, and nitrates. In this 
exercise, the potency of nitrates for mortality effects is treated as distinct from the potency of 
sulfates. Sulfates are considered relatively more potent than other constituents of PM10; and 
nitrates are treated as comparable to other components of PM10.19 For morbidity PM10 is modeled 
according to a scheme designed to avoid double counting of measures such as symptom days and 
restricted activity days, using a variety of studies from the literature.20 NOx is included for 
respiratory symptom days, eye irritation days, and phlegm days. 
Inputs to the health effects module consist of changes in ambient concentrations of SO2 
and NOx, demographic information on the population of interest, and miscellaneous additional 
information, such as background PM10 levels for analysis of thresholds, though no thresholds are 
presumed to exist in this exercise. The change in the annual number of impacts of each health 
endpoint is the valued output. The health valuation submodule of TAF assigns monetary values 
taken from the environmental economics literature to the health effects estimates produced by 
the health effects module. The benefits are totaled to obtain annual health benefits for each year 
modeled. The numbers used to value these effects are similar to those used in recent regulatory 
impact analysis by EPA. In particular, the value of a statistical life (VSL) is adjusted somewhat 
downward, compared with EPA numbers, because EPA numbers are drawn primarily from 
studies of prime-age working males facing small risks of workplace mortality. In contrast, 
particulate pollution primarily affects seniors and people with impaired health status, and it is 
also thought to affect young children than the general population.21 Various authors suggest that 
the value of health effects should be responsive to the nature of the injury and issues like age and 
health status (Krupnick and others 2000). This controversy is discussed in EPA’s recent studies. 
                                                 
19 The PM10 mortality concentration-response function used in this analysis is drawn from Schwartz and Dockery 
(1992). 
20 For nitrates, which are modeled as PM10, morbidity endpoints include asthma attacks, chronic bronchitis in adults 
and children, chronic cough, emergency room visits, restricted activity days, hospital admissions, and respiratory 
symptom days. 
21 The value of a statistical life used is $3.815 million (1997 dollars), about 25% less than that used in recent EPA 
studies. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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5. Results 
The results of this analysis are presented in four parts.  We begin with a discussion of the 
effects of the different policies on NOx and carbon emissions and the health benefits associated 
with reduced NOx emissions. Next we present the changes in electricity markets associated with 
both restructuring and NOx policies that underlie these environmental effects. Then we discuss 
the approaches used by generators to comply with the NOx policies and how they are likely to 
change as a result of nationwide restructuring. The final section deals with the cost of the two 
SIP policies and the economic surplus changes associated with restructuring. 
5.1 Changes in Emissions and Health Benefits 
Our analysis indicates that comprehensive NOx regulation significantly reduces annual 
NOx emissions. Table 3 is a summary of annual NOx emission levels in 2008 under a baseline 
scenario that combines limited restructuring assumptions with the OTR seasonal NOx policy and 
differences from this baseline for all other scenarios. The table is divided into two sections, one 
for emissions in the SIP Call region and one for national NOx emissions. In each section of the 
table emission levels for the combined baseline (with limited restructuring and the OTR seasonal 
NOx policy) are reported in the shaded upper left-hand cell.  The remaining cells in each section 
of the table report changes in emission levels for alternative combinations of restructuring 
scenarios and NOx policies relative to the combined baseline scenario.   
Comparing the rows within each column in the top half of Table 3 illustrates our findings 
are consistent with the reductions expected by EPA. Under the limited restructuring scenario, a 
seasonal SIP policy reduces annual emissions within the SIP region by 30% and an annual SIP 
policy reduces emissions by 70%.  The two SIP policies achieve slightly greater reductions 
within the SIP Call region under a nationwide restructuring scenario with a reduction of 1194 
thousand tons from a seasonal SIP policy and of 2818 tons under an annual SIP policy.  
The table also illustrates the role of the SIP policies in muting emissions increases that 
otherwise would result from nationwide restructuring. In the absence of the SIP policies, NOx 
emissions within the SIP region in 2008 increase by 417 thousand tons, more than 12%, relative 
to the combined baseline. This is commensurate with an important increase in the net export of 
electricity leaving the SIP region under nationwide restructuring. However, through sensitivity 
analysis we find this increase in exports is not due to growth in transmission capability as 
conjectured in Section 2, but instead it is due to changes in the economics of power production 
that accompany the institution of marginal cost pricing. In particular, we find increased Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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utilization of coal facilities in the STV and ECAR subregions when these regions transition to 
marginal cost pricing. In the absence of a SIP policy most of the effects of restructuring on NOx 
emissions occur within the SIP Call region, where most of the older coal-fired generating 
capacity is located. Furthermore, the SIP policies fully mitigate the increase in emissions from 
restructuring under the baseline NOx policy, although absolute levels of emissions in the SIP 
region remain roughly 400 thousand tons greater with nationwide restructuring under each of the 
seasonal NOx policy scenarios. 
A comparison of the top and bottom halves of Table 3 shows that the changes in national 
NOx emissions associated with the different NOx policy scenarios are somewhat smaller than the 
changes identified within the SIP Call region. This finding suggests that increasing the 
stringency of the NOx policy within the SIP Call region leads to some shifting of generation to 
other regions and, therefore, to small NOx emissions leakages outside the SIP Call region. Again 
we find the change in electricity transmission is not due to expansion of transmission capability 
under nationwide restructuring. Instead, the leakage is due to the relative economics of power 
production.  
The emission results for NOx were entered into the TAF model to estimate changes in 
pollutant concentrations as a consequence of atmospheric transport and, in turn, changes in 
health status. Table 4 is a summary of the monetized values of those health impacts for the 
country as a whole in which changes from the combined baseline scenario are reported. Roughly 
80% of the reported health effects result from reductions in premature mortality, and the 
remaining 20% are attributable to morbidity changes. The health benefits results mirror the NOx 
emission results reported in Table 3. In the absence of tighter restrictions on NOx emissions in 
the SIP Call region, higher NOx emissions associated with nationwide restructuring have a 
negative effect on human health.  However, the introduction of the SIP NOx policies yields large 
health benefits and the largest benefits occur under the annual SIP policy relative to the OTR 
Seasonal policy under nationwide restructuring.  
Table 5 is a summary of the effects of restructuring and more comprehensive NOx 
policies on carbon emissions from the electricity sector both within the SIP Call region and 
across the nation. Although the SIP Seasonal policy leads to a slight decrease in the carbon 
emissions in the SIP Call region, nationwide it leads to a slight increase. The SIP Annual NOx 
policy leads to slightly higher carbon emissions both in the SIP Call region and nationwide under 
limited restructuring. With nationwide restructuring, carbon emissions in the SIP Call region and 
the nation are lower under the SIP policies than under the OTR baseline, though they remain 
higher than under limited restructuring under any of the NOX policies.    Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
17 
The effect of restructuring on carbon emissions is comparable to the effect on emissions 
of NOx. Within the SIP Call region, restructuring increases carbon emission increases more than 
7% in the absence of a NOx policy for the region and nearly 6% when restructuring is combined 
with the NOx emissions caps. Nationwide, restructuring with the OTR seasonal NOx policy 
baseline produces increases carbon emissions by 34.2 million metric ton, or almost 5%. Other 
studies have suggested that restructuring could lead to similarly large increases in carbon 
emissions.  In particular, when restructuring is predicted to result in more inter-regional power 
trading, the accelerated retirement of nuclear facilities or both, near-term increases in coal-fired 
generation and the associated increases in carbon emissions can be substantial. (Palmer and 
Burtraw 1997, Rothwell 1998)  The last two rows in the right-hand column of Table 5 show that 
adding a NOx policy in the SIP Call region on top of nationwide restructuring helps to reduce 
restructuring-related increases in nationwide carbon emissions, but carbon emissions are still 
about 4.4% higher than in the combined baseline. 
5.2 Changes in Technology, Output, and Price  
The results for emissions and health benefits follow in part from the effects of nationwide 
restructuring and more comprehensive NOx policies on the mix of technologies and fuels used to 
generate electricity. The results also follow from the change in the total amount of electricity 
generation. The policy changes have an effect on the price of electricity, although not always the 
one generally anticipated. 
Table 6 is a summary of the effects of the NOx policies and nationwide restructuring on 
generation by fuel, total generation, and the retail price of electricity in the SIP Call region. This 
table reports levels for each variable in the combined baseline scenario in the first row and 
changes from baseline in subsequent rows. Neither of the NOx SIP policies has much effect on 
total generation in the SIP Call region. Under limited restructuring, total generation falls by 
about 1% with the addition of a seasonal or an annual NOx emissions cap in the region. The SIP 
Seasonal policy increases the regional price by 1.1%, whereas the SIP Annual policy increases 
price by 0.7%.    
With the transition from limited to nationwide restructuring, price falls and consumption 
increases dramatically, and the contribution of coal-fired generation grows substantially. Under 
the OTR baseline, nationwide restructuring results in a 14% increase in coal-fired generation and 
a 25% decline in gas generation. Adding the two SIP policies to the nationwide restructuring Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
18 
scenario reduces the attractiveness of existing coal facilities and results in a smaller increase in 
coal-fired generation relative to the combined baseline. 
To some extent, existing coal-fired generation is used more intensively under nationwide 
restructuring because of the optimistic assumptions about improvements in productivity at 
existing facilities under this scenario. However, sensitivity analysis indicates that the assumption 
of time-of-day pricing for industrial customers has a relatively larger effect on the choice of 
generation technology. Time-of-day pricing provides an incentive for industrial customers to 
reduce consumption in the peak period and reduces the utilization of gas-fired units; and, time-
of-day pricing also provides an incentive for industrial customers to increase consumption during 
the baseload period, which is dominated by coal. In the absence of time-of-day pricing for 
industrial customers, we find more gas generation and significantly less coal generation, in 
addition to higher electricity prices and reduced consumption.  
The average electricity price in the SIP Call region falls by 2.8 $/MWh, or more than 4%, 
with nationwide restructuring under the OTR baseline NOx policy.  Adding a seasonal NOx 
policy in the SIP region reduces the restructuring-induced decline in electricity price by roughly 
one-third. Extending the NOx policy in the SIP region to an annual basis with nationwide 
restructuring reduces slightly further the restructuring-induced decline in electricity price. 
Nonetheless, average electricity price in the SIP Call region is 2.5% less than in the limited 
restructuring baseline with the OTR baseline NOx policy. In sum, the ordering of the effect on 
electricity price is reversed under limited and nationwide restructuring. Under limited 
restructuring, the seasonal SIP policy leads to a higher electricity price than the annual policy. 
This difference is mainly because of a switch from coal to gas under the seasonal policy as 
compared to an increased usage of coal under the annual policy. However, under nationwide 
restructuring the seasonal SIP policy leads to a lower electricity price than the annual policy, and 
there is almost no evidence of fuel switching due to the NOx policies even though coal is used 
less. 
Table 7, the national analog of Table 6, shows that in general the effect of the two SIP 
policies on electricity price under the limited restructuring baseline tends to be less pronounced 
nationally than in the SIP Call region, as one would expect. Under limited restructuring, the SIP 
seasonal policy produces a decline in coal-fired generation, but coal-fired generation increases 
with the SIP annual policy. The seasonal SIP policy induces fuel switching from coal to natural 
gas, although under the annual policy both coal and gas generation increase at the national level.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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Though renewable technologies constitute a small share of generation in the baseline, 
they are affected by the NOx policies in an unexpected way. Under limited restructuring, both the 
seasonal and annual SIP policies result in a decline in renewables generation for the nation of 
roughly 20 million MWh. Renewable generation falls under the SIP policies as an indirect 
consequence of the fact that the cost of natural gas generation falls relative to the cost of coal 
generation as coal installs post-combustion controls to reduce NOx emissions.  As a result gas 
units have higher utilization both within and outside the SIP region, and the fixed cost of gas 
units are spread over more generation. Consequently the cost of a new gas-fired plant per kWh of 
generation is lower and the going-forward profits of these plants are higher, making them more 
likely to be built. The utilization rate of wind generation is unaffected by these changes because 
it has low variable costs and is always operated when wind resources are available. However, the 
new gas-fired capacity crowds out the construction of new renewables, primarily new wind 
turbines.  In particular, we see more new gas combined cycle plants being constructed and fewer 
wind turbines being constructed in ECAR under the SIP policies.  In SPP, which is outside of the 
SIP region, new combined cycle and combustion turbine plants displace new wind plants, and 
exports from SPP into the SIP region increase.  
In comparison to the combined baseline, the RPS included in the nationwide restructuring 
scenario results in a 28 billion kilowatt hour (kWh), or 50%, increase in renewables generation 
nationwide.  The introduction of the SIP policies has hardly any further effect on the renewables 
generation under nationwide restructuring when the RPS policy also is in effect.  
A comparison of the bottom sections of Tables 6 and 7 shows that the effect of 
restructuring on national average electricity price is greater within the SIP Call region than it is 
nationwide.  Nonetheless, nationwide restructuring produces a 3.4% decline in national average 
electricity price under the OTR Baseline NOx policy and price declines of at least 2.6% when 
combined with a seasonal NOx policy. Table 7 also shows that nationwide restructuring results in 
substantial increases in coal generation and commensurate declines in gas-fired generation.  
Table 8 is a summary of the effects of the different policies on new capacity additions and it 
reveals that the increased coal generation comes from increased use of existing plants, whereas 
the decline in gas-fired generation comes largely from reduced investment in new plants. 
The negative effect of nationwide electricity restructuring on electricity price identified in 
these simulations depends importantly on the assumption that some subset of electricity 
consumers—in this case industrial customers—will face time-of-day pricing in restructured 
regions. When we perform a sensitivity analysis in which we exclude the possibility of time-of-
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nationwide restructuring. Switching from average cost pricing to marginal cost pricing produces 
efficiency gains that tend to lower prices, but this result is offset by two factors that tend to 
increase prices. One is the fact that marginal cost of generation and reserve is increasing and 
significantly higher than average cost during peak periods. Under marginal cost pricing, 
producers have the opportunity to earn economic profits in excess of costs that is not possible 
under average cost pricing. The second factor is the incentive compatible institution used to price 
reserves in restructured regions. This mechanism compensates all participants in energy and 
reserve markets for supplying reserve services and thereby increases total payments for reserves 
during peak time periods, which tends to increase prices. When the prices faced by at least some 
consumers vary by time-of-day these consumers can respond to increases in peak prices by 
reducing demand, thereby keeping price increases in check. However, when prices do not vary 
by time-of-day, the effect of providing reserve services on average price is more diluted and so is 
the demand response. 
5.3 Emissions Control Investments 
The main way emissions are reduced to comply with the NOx emissions cap is by the 
installation of post-combustion controls. We model two types of post-combustion controls: 
selective catalytic reduction (SCR) and selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR). A 
distinguishing feature of these technologies is that SCR is likely to have higher capital costs and 
somewhat lower variable costs per ton of NOx reduced than SNCR. Therefore, the decision about 
which type of post-combustion control to install would be influenced by the expected utilization 
of a facility. Other things equal, a base load unit that is utilized many hours of the year would be 
more likely to install SCR, and a unit that is utilized fewer hours of the year would be more 
likely to install SNCR.  
The amounts of capacity retrofitted with post-combustion controls are reported in Table 
9. This table includes only retrofit controls; it does not include controls installed to comply with 
NSPS. It shows that the total amount of post-combustion retrofits changes very little with a shift 
from a seasonal to an annual NOx policy. However, there is a shift toward more use of SCR 
relative to SNCR under the SIP annual policy, under both limited and nationwide restructuring. 
Table 10 is a summary of the annual operation and maintenance (O&M) expenses, capital 
expenses, and total expenses for all types of post-combustion controls combined in the baseline, 
and the added expense under each NOx policy and with nationwide restructuring. The total 
additional annual cost of a SIP seasonal policy with limited restructuring is 2.15 billion dollars. 
Additional compliance costs are roughly 27% higher for an annual SIP policy than a seasonal Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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SIP policy. Under nationwide restructuring, an annual SIP policy yields total additional 
compliance costs of 2.87 billion dollars, which are about 17% higher than for a seasonal SIP 
policy. 
Table 11 is a summary of the cost of post-combustion control per ton of emission 
reductions achieved under the policy scenarios at all generating units in the SIP Call region.  In 
the baseline, a marginal cost of about $1,356 per ton is reported, which is the marginal cost of 
reductions in the eastern OTR states. In the SIP Seasonal scenario with limited restructuring, the 
average cost in 2008 is $2,112 per ton, and the marginal cost (equivalent to the predicted price 
for an emissions allowance) is about $3,401 per ton.22 When the cap is extended year-round in 
the SIP Annual scenario, the average cost under limited restructuring falls to $1,133 per ton, and 
the marginal cost falls to below $1,985.  
Under nationwide restructuring the average cost of a seasonal NOx cap is about $300 
more than in the limited restructuring scenario, but the marginal cost is about $30 lower. For an 
annual policy under nationwide restructuring the average cost of NOx control is roughly $60 
greater and the marginal cost of control is about $180 lower than in the limited restructuring 
case. 
Figure 1 shows how the marginal control cost curve under a seasonal SIP policy changes 
with nationwide restructuring. Because of greater coal use in the absence of the policy, the 
amount of total NOx emission reductions required in the summer season to achieve the cap is 
higher with nationwide restructuring than under limited restructuring. The quantities to be 
reduced are illustrated by the vertical lines. However, because the technology (model plant) that 
determined the marginal cost of control is run more under nationwide restructuring, its marginal 
control costs with SCR is less than under limited restructuring because the capital costs are 
spread over a greater number of kWh. Consequently, it shifts back in the schedule of marginal 
cost of control. As a result a different technology becomes marginal and the marginal cost of 
control, and equivalently the permit price falls. 
                                                 
22 Average cost is calculated as the ratio of the total cost of post-combustion controls divided by the total change in 
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5.4 Economic Costs and Benefits 
The cost of post-combustion controls plus any change in electricity price do not 
constitute the total economic cost of a policy. A complete measure of compliance cost for the 
NOx control policies would include the cost of switching fuels as well as the out-of-pocket 
abatement expenditures represented by post-combustion controls. And to electricity price 
increases, which affect consumers’ pocketbooks, one must add the loss in well being from a 
reduction in electricity consumption and the portion of the compliance costs borne by producers.  
Similarly the benefits of nationwide restructuring include the changes in producer profits that 
result from the policy as well as the change in consumer well-being associated with increased 
electricity consumption in response to the fall in electricity prices that results from restructuring. 
To achieve a more complete measure of economic cost, we estimate changes in consumer 
and producer surplus under various policies. Consumer surplus represents the difference between 
willingness to pay for electricity services and the price actually paid by consumers. Producer 
surplus represents the difference between revenues received by producers and the costs incurred 
in providing electricity service. By construction, in average cost regions the price is such that 
producer surplus is approximately zero. 
Table 12 is a summary of the changes in consumer and producer surplus in the electricity 
sector relative to the combined baseline (OTR Seasonal case with Limited Restructuring) for the 
year 2008.23 Numbers in parentheses indicate the changes relative to values under the OTR 
Seasonal case with Nationwide Restructuring.  
Under the limited restructuring scenario, both the seasonal and annual SIP policies result 
in a loss in total social surplus.  The SIP policies lead to higher costs, but since prices decrease 
because of the SIP policies, producers lose while consumers are better off. However, the total 
change in economic surplus is less than the estimated compliance cost for both the seasonal and 
annual NOx policies reported in Table 10. This finding follows from the observation noted in 
Section 2 that the opportunity cost to consumers, or equivalently the marginal consumer surplus, 
is less than the marginal cost of production when average cost is less than marginal cost. This 
                                                 
23 Changes outside the electricity sector could be important due to pre-existing policies, such as the labor income 
tax, or market structure that distorts markets away from economic efficiency. The interaction of new environmental 
policies with pre-existing distortions can amplify the effect of pre-existing distortions (Goulder et al., 1999). Table 
12 does not report consumer surplus measures for the combined basecase because the constant elasticity demand 
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occurs in most time blocks. Consequently, under limited restructuring the foregone economic 
surplus that results from raising prices or reducing consumption is less than the out-of-pocket 
cost of reducing pollution (Oates and Strassman, 1984). However, if the inefficient pricing 
problem was eliminated with time-of-day marginal-cost pricing of electricity, the economic cost 
of the NOx control policy would be guaranteed to be greater than changes in production cost. 
Implementing nationwide restructuring leads to gains in social surplus composed of 
substantial gain for consumers and producers. The increase in surplus is due to increased 
production efficiency and to allocational efficiency improvements resulting from pricing of 
electricity closer to marginal cost. The distribution of the surplus increase depends on the change 
in electricity price. In time blocks when marginal costs are greater than average costs, then 
average electricity revenue under marginal cost pricing may exceed average cost, resulting in 
producer surplus. The converse holds when marginal costs are less than average costs. In the 
aggregate consumers could benefit or not from the transition to marginal cost pricing. However, 
in our model producers are sure to benefit because of the provision for recovery of 90% of any 
costs that are stranded by the transition to greater competition.   
One can look down the columns of Table 12 to compare the total economic cost of each 
NOx policy under a given restructuring policy. Under limited restructuring, the incremental cost 
of a SIP Seasonal policy is $1.8 billion. Consumers are better off because of lower electricity 
prices and producers bear all the costs. One significant reason this occurs is that under limited 
restructuring about three-quarters of coal-fired generation occurs in regions with average cost 
pricing. In these regions the price of allowances received at zero cost by a firm is not reflected in 
electricity price. Consequently, consumers benefit due to lower effect on price under limited 
restructuring, although this comes at the expense of allocational efficiency. The incremental total 
economic cost of extending the seasonal policy to the SIP Annual policy is $830 million. 
Consumers and producers share the incremental cost of extending the policy from a seasonal to 
an annual basis.   
Under nationwide restructuring the cost of a SIP Seasonal policy is $2.24 billion, or 27% 
higher than under limited restructuring, and in the case of nationwide restructuring consumers 
bear most of the cost of a seasonal policy while the increase in consumer surplus due to 
restructuring is reduced. The incremental economic cost of extending the seasonal policy to the 
SIP Annual policy is $570 million, and consumers bear all of the incremental cost of extending 
the policy to an annual basis.  Producers lose only a modest amount under the seasonal NOx 
policies but they actually benefit slightly by extending the seasonal policy to an annual NOx 
policy. Despite the costs of the NOx policies, when compared to the combined limited Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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restructuring baseline with the OTR Seasonal NOx policy, the social surplus gains from 
restructuring dramatically outweigh the losses associated with adding either SIP policy.    
The change in consumer surplus associated with different policies can be decomposed 
into the portions associated with each of the three different classes of customers. Table 13 
provides that breakdown. Under limited restructuring, the consumer surplus gains associated 
with a SIP seasonal policy are shared almost equally between residential and commercial 
customers, with industrial customers experience a slight loss in surplus.  Under a SIP annual 
policy with limited restructuring, total consumer surplus gains are smaller than with a seasonal 
policy.  Residential and commercial customers have slightly smaller surplus gains under an 
annual policy and industrial customers lose under this policy. Industrial consumers also bear the 
largest portion of the consumer surplus losses from both types of SIP policies under nationwide 
restructuring.  
Among the three customer classes, industrial consumers are also the main beneficiaries of 
nationwide restructuring. They receive close to half of the surplus gains from nationwide 
restructuring under the OTR seasonal NOx baseline. Commercial customers receive the next 
largest share of surplus gains, and surplus gains attributable to residential customers are typically 
less than half the size of those attributable to industrial customers. The large share attributable to 
industrial customers follows from the combination of a relatively flat load shape and access to 
time-varying prices. As a result of restructuring, prices during the base period fall by more than 
the average prices paid by other customer classes. Because compared to commercial or 
residential customers, industrial customers have more constant demand over the course of the 
year, they benefit even more from these larger price declines. Industrial demand falls some 
during peak periods in response to higher prices there, but these reductions in demand are more 
than offset by increases in consumer surplus in the base periods.  
This analysis provides only an incomplete accounting of costs and benefits of 
restructuring and NOx control policies. Costs are underreported because we exclude costs outside 
the electricity sector associated with interactions with existing policies such as labor income 
taxes (Goulder, et al. 1999). Benefit estimates are incomplete because we report only benefits 
stemming from particulate-related improvements in health status and ignore benefits from 
reduced acidification, materials damage and concentrations of ozone (U.S. EPA. 1998c). 
Nonetheless, we can compare net benefits of each NOx policy option under each restructuring 
scenario to examine the relative cost-effectiveness of the policies, given this information. Table 
14 summarizes results from previous tables and allows us to calculate net benefits, as the sum of 
benefits and costs, for each scenario.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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The first observation to make is that under limited restructuring the difference between 
benefits and economic costs is improved, compared to a measure that compared benefits to 
compliance costs.  This improvement occurs because economic cost is less than compliance cost 
under limited restructuring. Second, we observe that the economic surplus loss in the electricity 
sector under limited restructuring is $830 million greater under the annual policy than under the 
seasonal policy. However, health benefits improve by $1.03 billion under the annual policy. 
Consequently, we find an annual policy under limited restructuring would capture about $200 
million in additional net benefits. This finding reaffirms earlier findings that examined only 
compliance cost rather than economic cost and found that an annual SIP program is more cost 
effective than a seasonal one under limited restructuring (Burtraw et al, 2000). 
The finding applies even more strongly to the nationwide restructuring scenario. Table 14 
reports that the SIP Annual policy yields almost $620 million in additional net benefits compared 
to the SIP Seasonal policy. The inclusion of benefits resulting from reduced ozone 
concentrations would not alter this conclusion because ozone-related benefits accrue mostly in 
the summer season and therefore would increase the measured net benefits of both NOx policies 
about equally. However, non-health related benefits from particulate reductions accrue on an 
annual basis. The EPA (U.S. EPA. 1998c) suggests benefits from reduced nitrogen deposition 
would be on the order of magnitude of $300 million per year, and most of these would accrue 
outside the summer season. The inclusion of these benefits would strengthen the relative cost-
effectiveness of an annual policy.  
6. Conclusion 
The debate surrounding restructuring of the electricity industry often has been 
acrimonious. A key point of contention has been the concern that gains that may be realized 
through lower electricity prices would be offset to an important degree by a deleterious increase 
in pollutant emissions. 
This study looks at various effects of retail restructuring of electricity markets and likely 
concurrent changes in environmental regulations. The results of this study are consistent with 
those of earlier studies that show that both producers and consumers benefit as a result of 
electricity market restructuring. Producers benefit as a result of increased productive efficiency, 
and consumers benefit from lower prices.  Consumer surplus gains to industrial customers are 
more than twice as large as those accruing to residential customers and the gains to commercial 
customers are in between. Our findings with respect to surplus changes stem importantly from Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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several key assumptions in our model about the extent of recovery of stranded costs, the extent 
of productivity enhancements associated with greater competition, the operation of reserve 
markets, the institutions used to compensate all electricity suppliers for reserve services and 
access to time-of-day pricing of electricity. 
Our results also are consistent with those of earlier studies that suggest electricity 
restructuring could increase air pollution.  Widespread adoption of electricity restructuring leads 
to a greater reliance on coal relative to natural gas and thus leads to higher NOx and carbon 
emissions. Implementing a NOx control policy that caps either seasonal or annual emissions of 
NOx in the eastern United States could offset the increase in NOx emissions. However, the NOx 
policies would do little to combat the increase in carbon emissions from restructuring because 
most of the NOx reductions are attributable to the installation of post-combustion controls and 
not to fuel switching away from coal. 
The cost of environmental compliance in the nationwide restructuring case is moderately 
higher than in the limited restructuring scenario for both seasonal and annual SIP policies. 
Compliance cost of post-combustion controls range from 5% to 14% higher in the nationwide 
restructuring case, and the average cost per ton ranges from 5% to 15% higher in the nationwide 
restructuring case. At the same time, electricity price under nationwide restructuring combined 
with each of the environmental scenarios is lower than electricity price in the limited 
restructuring baseline with an OTR Seasonal NOx policy.  
But, out of pocket compliance costs do not represent the full economic costs of these 
policies. An examination of the changes in economic surplus resulting from the incremental 
environmental policies compared to the OTR Seasonal NOx baseline, under a given restructuring 
scenario, reveals that the economic costs in the electricity sector of both SIP policies are higher 
in the nationwide restructuring case. These costs range from 8%-27% higher than in the limited 
restructuring case, when measured against the OTR Seasonal NOx baseline under each 
restructuring regime. The additional costs stem in part from changes in electricity price, which 
yield commensurate increases in revenue for producers and reductions in electricity consumption 
by consumers.  More fundamentally, the relative opportunity costs of emission reductions are 
greater under nationwide restructuring because of the greater utilization of coal.  
Under limited restructuring, we find consumers are insulated from the cost of the SIP 
Seasonal NOx policy and actually gain consumer surplus due to the decline in electricity price 
while producer surplus loss is greater than the compliance cost. Under nationwide restructuring, 
however, consumers bear most of the cost of a SIP seasonal NOx policy and producers are Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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insulated from the cost. In moving from a seasonal to an annual policy consumers pay about 70% 
of the cost under limited restructuring, while under nationwide restructuring consumers pay the 
full cost and more, leaving producers indifferent between an annual NOx policy and the OTR 
Seasonal NOx baseline.  
Among customer classes, we find that while residential and commercial customers split 
the gains from the two SIP NOx policies under limited restructuring, industrial customers always 
lose under these more stringent NOx policies.  Under nationwide restructuring, industrial 
customers also lose more than do commercial or residential customers as a result of the two SIP 
policies.  
Finally and most importantly for current policymakers, our results confirm the findings of 
prior work with respect to the greater cost-effectiveness of an annual SIP policy relative to a 
seasonal SIP policy under both restructuring scenarios.  The additional health benefits from 
reduced concentrations of particulates associated with an annual NOx cap in the SIP region more 
than outweigh the additional costs of an annual policy relative to a seasonal one. In the limited 
restructuring case, we find an annual policy would provide over $200 million in additional net 
benefits compared to a seasonal policy.    
The relative cost effectiveness of an annual NOx policy is even greater under nationwide 
restructuring. We find that the annual policy under nationwide restructuring yields $620 million 
in additional net benefits compared to a seasonal NOx policy.  
The benefit side of this calculation includes only particulate related health benefits from 
NOx reductions. Incorporating estimates from the literature of the non-health related benefits 
from reduced nitrogen deposition would make the annual policy appear even more cost-effective 
than a seasonal policy. The net benefits of the NOx policies are negative in all cases, based on 
just the partial measure of particulate related health benefits. Other analysis suggests the 
inclusion of non-health and non-particulate health benefits including especially ozone benefits 
would be likely to make net benefits positive (U.S. EPA. 1998c). This analysis demonstrates that 
the net benefits would be greatest in any case under an annual approach in place of a seasonal 
approach to controlling NOx emissions in the SIP region. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
28 
References  
Ando, Amy W., and Karen L. Palmer. 1998. Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of 
State-Level Electricity Restructuring. Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, May. 
98–19.  
Bloyd, Cary, et al. 1996. Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) Model Documentation and 
User's Guide, ANL/DIS/TM-36. Argonne National Laboratory, December. 
Brennan, Timothy.  1998. Demand-Side Management Programs Under Retail Electricity 
Competition.  Discussion Paper 99-02. Washington, DC:  Resources for the Future 
(October). 
Burtraw, Dallas, Karen L. Palmer and Anthony Paul. 1999. The Impact of Electricity 
Restructuring on NOx Emissions Affecting the Environment in Maryland. Final Report to 
the State of Maryland Department of Natural Resources Power Plant Research Program, 
(November 15). Washington DC: Resources for the Future. 
Burtraw, Dallas; Karen Palmer, Ranjit Bharvirkar and Anthony Paul.  2000. Cost Effective 
Reduction of NOx Emissions from Electricity Generation.  Discussion Paper 00-55Rev. 
Washington, DC:  Resources for the Future (December). 
Burtraw, Dallas, Karen Palmer, and Martin Heintzelman.  2000. Electricity Restructuring:  
Consequences and Opportunities for the Environment. Discussion Paper 00-39.  
Washington, DC:  Resources for the Future (September). 
Center for Clean Air Policy. 1996a. Comments of the Center for Clean Air Policy on the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement on Open Access for Transmission Service, February 
(Washington, DC, Center for Clean Air Policy). 
Center for Clean Air Policy. 1996b. Emission Impacts of Increased Energy Exports from the 
American Electric Power (AEP) System, (Washington, DC, draft discussion paper) 
February 2. 
Center for Clean Air Policy. 1996c. Emissions Impacts of Competition Further Analysis in 
Consideration of Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, Inc.’s Critique, (Washington, DC, report), 
June 17. Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
29 
Clemmer, Steven L.; Nogee, Alan; Brower, Michael C. 1999. A Powerful Opportunity: Making 
Renewable Electricity the Standard. Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 
(January). 
Environmental Defense.  2000. Building on 30 Years of Clean Air Act Success: The Case for 
Reducing NOx Air Pollution, Boulder, CO: Environmental Defense (December). 
Energy Modeling Forum. 1998. A Competitive Electricity Industry EMF Report 15, Volume 1 
(April). 
Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W.H. Parry, Roberton C. Williams III, and Dallas Burtraw. 1999. The 
Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-
Best Setting.  Journal of Public Economics 72 (3): 329–60. 
Hunt, Sally, and Kristina Sepetys.  1997.  Price, Now Less Than Ever. Public Utilities 
Fortnightly, October, p. 62. 
Krupnick, Alan, Anna Alberini, Maureen Cropper, Nathalie Simon, Bernie O’Brien, Ron 
Goeree, and Martin Heintzelman. 2000. Age, Health, and the Willingness to Pay for 
Mortality Risk Reductions: A Contingent Valuation Survey of Ontario Residents. 
Discussion Paper 00–37. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future (September). 
Lee, Henry, and S. K. Verma. 2000. Coal or Gas: the Cost of Cleaner Power in the Midwest, 
Cambridge, MA: Environment and Natural Resources Program, Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (August). 
Lee, Henry and Negeen Darani. 1996. Electricity Restructuring and the Environment. The 
Electricity Journal, December. 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). 2000. Reliability Impacts of the EPA NOX 
SIP Call. Reliability Assessment Subcommittee, North American Electric Reliability 
Council (February). 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1995. Peer Review of the Tracking and Analysis Framework 
(TAF) for Use in the 1996 NAPAP Integrated Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN (ORNL/M-
4994). 
Oates, Wallace E. and D.L. Strassmann. 1984. Effluent Fees and Market Structure. Journal of 
Public Economics 24(June): 29–46. 
Palmer, Karen. 1997. Electricity Restructuring: Environmental Impacts. Forum for Applied 
Research and Public Policy 12(3): 28–33.  Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
30 
Palmer, Karen. 2001. Electricity Restructuring: Shortcut or Detour on the Road to Achieving 
Greenhouse Gas Reductions? in Climate Change Economics and Policy: An RFF 
Anthology, edited by Michael Toman.  Washington, DC:  Resources for the Future.  
Palmer, Karen and Dallas Burtraw. 1997. Electricity Restructuring and Regional Air Pollution. 
Resource and Energy Economics 19: 139–74. 
Palmer, Karen, Dallas Burtraw and Anthony Paul. 1998. The Welfare Impacts of Restructuring 
and Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Electric Power Sector, Resources for the 
Future (October). 
Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG). 1998. The Impact of EPA’s Regional SIP Call on the 
Reliability of the Electric Power Supply in the Eastern United States. Applied Economic 
Research for the Utility Air Regulatory Group, (August 10, August 26 and September 
11). 
Rosen, Richard; et al. 1995. Promoting Environmental Quality in a Restructured Electric 
Industry. Prepared for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
(Boston Tellus Institute), December 15. 
Rothwell, G. 1998. Air Pollution Fees and the Risk of Early Retirement at U.S. Nuclear Power 
Plants. Department of Economics, Stanford University, mimeo, (October). 
Schwartz, J., and D.W. Dockery. 1992. Particulate Air Pollution and Daily Mortality in 
Steubenville, Ohio.  American Journal of Epidemiology 135 (1): 12–19. 
U.S. DOE (Department of Energy). 1999. Supporting Analysis for the Comprehensive Electricity 
Competition Act.  DOE/PO-0059.  Washington, DC:  Department of Energy (May). 
U.S. EIA (Energy Information Administration). 1996. An Analysis of FERC’s Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for Electricity Open Access and Recovery of Stranded 
Cost. Prepared for Senator James Jeffords, Vice Chair, Subcommittee on Energy 
Production and Regulation, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, U.S. 
Senate, (September). 
U.S. EIA. 1999. Annual Energy Outlook 2000. DOE/EIA-0383(2000). Washington, DC: 
Department of Energy. 
U.S. EIA. 2000. Status of State Electricity Industry Restructuring Activity.  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/regmap.html (accessed December 18, 
2000). Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
31 
U.S. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 1997. Ozone Transport Commission NOx Budget 
Program: An Overview. Washington, DC: EPA Office of Air and Radiation, Acid Rain 
Division. http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/otc/ovrvw.html 
U.S. EPA. 1998a. Analyzing Electric Power Generation under the CAAA. Washington, DC: EPA 
Office of Air and Radiation. 
U.S. EPA. 1998b. Supplemental Ozone Transport Rulemaking Regulatory Analysis. Washington, 
DC: EPA Office of Air and Radiation (April 7). 
U.S. EPA. 1998c. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the NOX SIP Call, FIP, and Section 126 
Petition, Volume 2: Health and Welfare Benefits. Washington, DC: EPA Office of Air 
and Radiation (December). 
U.S. EPA. 1999. Analysis of Emissions Reduction Options for the Electric Power Industry. 
Washington, DC: EPA Office of Air and Radiation (March). 
U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 1996a. Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities 
(RM95-8-000) and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting 
Utilities (RM94-7-001). FERC/EIS-0096 Washington, DC, (April). 
U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 1996b. Environmental Impact Statement, 
Promoting Wholesale Competition through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Cost by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, (April). 
U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 1999. Regional Transmission 
Organizations, Order No. 2000. Washington DC, (December). 
White, Matthew.  1996.  Power Struggles:  Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity 
Markets, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1996, pp. 201-250. 
 
 
 Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
32 
Table 1. NERC subregions, the year marginal cost pricing begins, and subregions 
covered by cap and trade NOX policies under modeled scenarios. 


















ECAR  MI, IN, OH, WV; part of KY, 
VA, PA 
- 2004    ECAR 
ERCOT  Most of TX  2002  2002     
MAAC  MD, DC, DE, NJ; most of PA  2000  2000  MAAC  MAAC 
MAIN  Most of IL, WI; part of MO  -  2004    MAIN 
MAPP  MN, IA, NE, SD, ND; part of 
WI, IL 
- 2008     
NE  VT, NH, ME, MA, CT, RI  2000  2000  NE  NE 
NY NY  1999  1999  NY  NY 
FRCC  Most of FL  -  2008     
STV  TN, AL, GA, SC, NC; part of 
VA, MS, KY, FL 
- 2008    STV 
SPP  KS, MO, OK, AR, LA; part of 
MS, TX 
- 2008     
NWP  WA, OR, ID, UT, MT, part of 
WY, NV 
- 2008     
RA  AZ, NM, CO, part of WY  -  2004     
CNV  CA, part of NV  1998  1998     
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Table 2. Distinguishing features of restructuring scenarios in 2008. 
  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
Ratio of Technical Parameter Values 
2008 to 1997 
  
    Maximum Availability Factor  1.0205  1.0411 
    Heat Rate  0.9864  0.9730 
    General and Administrative Cost  0.7500  0.6741 
    Non-Fuel O&M Cost  0.7642  0.7001 
Transmission Capacity  -  10 % increase from 2008 
Renewables Portfolio Standard  None  RPS with $17 per MWh 
price cap on tradable 
renewable credits 
 
Table 3. Annual NOx emissions in the SIP Call region and nation in the OTR Seasonal Limited 
Restructuring Case, and changes under alternative scenarios for 2008 (thousand tons). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide 
  SIP Region  
OTR Seasonal   3,449  +417 
SIP Seasonal  -1,031 -777 
SIP Annual  -2,408 -2,401 
  Nation  
OTR Seasonal   5,533  +567 
SIP Seasonal  -992 -623 
SIP Annual  -2,378 -2,266 
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Table 4. Annual particulate-related health benefits due to changes in NOx emissions from 
the OTR Seasonal Limited Restructuring Case under alternative scenarios for 2008 
(Billion 1997 dollars). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
OTR Seasonal     -0.29 
SIP Seasonal  +0.75 +0.59 




Table 5: Annual carbon emissions in the SIP Call region and nation for the OTR Seasonal 
Limited Restructuring Case, and changes under alternative scenarios for 2008  
(million metric tons). 
NOx Policy 
Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
  SIP Region  
OTR Seasonal  





  Nation 
OTR Seasonal  
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Table 6: Annual generation by fuel and electricity price in the SIP Call region in the OTR 
Seasonal Limited Restructuring Case, and changes under alternative scenarios, for 2008. 
Policy Scenario  Regional Generation 
 (million MWh) 
Regional Price 
(1997$/MWh) 
  Coal Gas  Total   
 Limited Restructuring    
   OTR Seasonal NOx  1,095  460  2,139  64.4 
   SIP Seasonal NOx  -19 +4  -20  +0.7 
   SIP Annual NOx  +11 -19 -7  +0.5 
Nationwide Restructuring         
   OTR Seasonal NOx  +157 -116 +45  -2.8 
   SIP Seasonal NOx  +130 -112 +23  -1.9 
   SIP Annual NOx  +134 -115 +23  -1.6 
 
 
Table 7: Annual generation by fuel and electricity price in the nation in the OTR Seasonal 
Limited Restructuring Case, and change under alternative scenarios, for 2008. 
Policy Scenario  National Generation 
 (million MWh) 
National Price 
(1997$/MWh) 
  Coal Gas  Total   
 Limited Restructuring        
   OTR Seasonal NOx  1,767  1,182  3,996  62.2 
   SIP Seasonal NOx  -8 +39  +1  -0.3 
   SIP Annual NOx  +17 +21  +14  -0.1 
Nationwide Restructuring         
   OTR Seasonal NOx  +230 -241 +36  -2.1 
   SIP Seasonal NOx  +205 -221 +24  -1.6 
   SIP Annual NOx  +204 -220 +23  -1.4 Resources for the Future  Palmer, Burtraw, Bharvirkar, and Paul 
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Table 8: National cumulative new generation capacity by fuel in the OTR Seasonal 
Limited Restructuring Case, and changes under alternative scenarios, for 2008 (MW). 
Policy Scenario  Coal Gas  Total 
 Limited Restructuring    
   OTR Seasonal NOx  2,611  222,210  239,800 
   SIP Seasonal NOx  -35 +5,000 -5,600 
   SIP Annual NOx  +55 -700 -9,800 
Nationwide Restructuring       
   OTR Seasonal NOx  -997 -58,980 -53,500 
   SIP Seasonal NOx  -188 -59,200 -55,000 
   SIP Annual NOx  -215 -55,930 -51,200 
 
Table 9: Nationwide retrofit post-combustion capacity in the OTR Seasonal Limited 
Restructuring Case, and changes under alternative scenarios for 2008 (thousand MW). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
  SCR SNCR  Total  SCR  SNCR  Total 
OTR Seasonal   0.00 11.44  11.44  0.00 +0.98 +0.98
SIP Seasonal  +144.20 +57.36 +201.56 +168.10 +29.18 +197.28
SIP Annual  +169.60 +30.35 +199.95 +185.60 +7.56 +193.16
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Table 10: National annual cost of post-combustion control in the OTR Seasonal Limited 
Restructuring Case, and changes under alternative scenarios in 2008  
(billion 1997 dollars). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
 O&M  Capital  Total  O&M  Capital  Total 
OTR Seasonal   0.016   0.014  0.030  +0.002 0.001 +0.003 
SIP Seasonal  +0.995 +1.151 +2.146 +1.152 +1.304 +2.456 





Table 11: Cost per ton of adopting post-combustion control for 2008  (1997 dollars per 
ton of NOX reduction). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
  Average Marginal Average Marginal 
OTR Seasonal   -  1,356  - 1,334 
SIP Seasonal  2,112 3,401 2,438 3,370 
SIP Annual  1,133 1,985 1,195 1,801 
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Table 12: Changes in consumer and producer surplus under alternative scenarios, for 
2008. Parentheses indicate change from OTR Seasonal case under Nationwide 
Restructuring Scenario (billion 1997 dollars). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   









OTR Seasonal   -  -  -  +7.60 +6.04  +13.64 















Table 13: Changes in consumer surplus by customer class under alternative scenarios, 
for 2008 (billion 1997 dollars). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring Scenario 
  Limited Nationwide   
  Customer Class  Customer Class 
 Residential  Commercial  Industrial  Residential  Commercial  Industrial 
OTR Seasonal   -  -  -  +1.40 +2.82  +3.32 
SIP Seasonal  +0.60 +0.57 -0.06 +1.00 +2.33  +2.34 
SIP Annual  +0.50 +0.42 -0.39 +0.60 +1.90  +2.28 
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Table 14: Changes in economic surplus in the electricity sector, changes in particulate-
related health benefits, and calculation of net benefits for 2008 (billion 1997 dollars). 
NOx Policy  Restructuring 
  Limited Nationwide   






















OTR Seasonal   -  -  -  +13.64 -0.29  +13.35 
SIP Seasonal  -1.76 0.75 -1.01  +11.40  0.59 +11.99 
SIP Annual  -2.59 1.78 -0.81  +10.83  1.78  +12.61 
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Figure 1: Required emission reductions and schedule of marginal costs of control for SIP 
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